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1. Uniqueness of Social Attitude in Japan
In the ﬁeld of comparative social and political attitudes both similar and unique
aspects are found among countries, and to display this many models have been invented.
In general Japanese and German people have been both regarded as diligent and ori-
ented to order and rules, but there are also differences.
- In the 1930s, dictatorship arose in several countries, gaining wide support of the nation
with propaganda and violence. But resistance to and escape from dictatorship spread in
Germany and Italy, not in Japan. (And later in Spain, Chile, South Korea, Taiwan etc., and
not in North Korea.)
- In the Second World War, Japanese soldiers and commanders obeyed to even the
orders of suicide attack (Tokkou) and orders to ﬁght until the last man without surrender
(Gyokusai), and sometimes requested Japanese civilians to follow in Saipan and Okinawa.
Such orders were too authoritative and objectively irrational, although subjectively heroic
or useful to postpone the ﬁnal surrender of the empire. (This delay induced two socialist
countries in East Asia)1).
- In the postwar period, Germany established a pluralistic, well-balanced party system
from conservatives to social democrats, even under the pressure of anti-communism doc-
＊ Professor (Public Administration/ Political Science), Faculty of Law, Ritsumeikan University.
1) Here I recommend the following Japanese ﬁlms, which can be watched in DVDs. “Kumo Nagaruru
Hateni”, “Otokotati no Yamato”, “Gun-batu” and “Himeyuri no Tou”. To the contrary, German general
Rommel is said to have reinterpreted Hitlerʼs order to ﬁght ʻuntil the last manʼ to ʻuntil the last bulletʼ,
in order to indirectly permit surrender, in the German ﬁlm “Rommel”. Such independent and rational
attitude is seen also in the Italian war ﬁlm “El Alamein - La linea del fuoco”.
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trine to counter to especially the authoritative East Germany. Therefore the German Con-
stitution has been revised many times, but all with the agreement of major parties
(Deutscher Bundestag 2009).
In Japan one party dominance system by the conservative LDP continued from 1955
to 1993. This was under the circumstance of the Cold War and hostile neighboring social-
ist countries, but not against the communist ʻPeopleʼs Republic of East Japanʼ. Japan
ﬁnally realized the ﬁrst government change in 1993, and again in 2009 by the Democratic
Party (Murakami 2009). The latter government brought new policies as well as failures,
but was blamed in the Fukushima nuclear accident, although the melt down itself was the
result of the former policy under the long LDP reign. Then the LDP under Prime Minister
Abe again established a stronger majority, which reached together with the cooperating
Komei and Ishin Parties even the two thirds of both Diet Chambers after the Upper House
election in 2016, facilitated through the single-member district system (Murakami 2017).
In total Japanese politics is leaning to the right (Tsukada ed. 2017).
- Today irrational ultra-nationalism and populism exist in both countries. In Germany,
Nazis symbols are prohibited. In Japan many books by essayists, magazines and internet
comments despise China and Korea, justify Japanʼs war in the 1930s. They at the same
time despise and deny totally the liberal parties, scholars and newspapers, by attaching the
label of ʻthe anti-Japanʼ.
- Longer working hours and overwork death (Karoshi) of employees is not rare even in
todayʼs ʻafﬂuentʼ Japan.
On the other hand, Japanese society and politics shows some remarkable develop-
ments, similar to other democracies.
- Protests against nuclear power stations have been spreading in both countries. How-
ever, the ofﬁcial policy to abolish all stations has been declared so far in Germany, and not
in Japan where people have been suffering from the devastating Fukushima accident in
2011. The electric power supply is almost sufﬁcient, therefore the proponents of nuclear
energy are electric power companies, some local people who have ʻvested interestʼ and
politicians interested in nuclear plant export and maybe in nuclear weapon technology.
And these relatively small supporters can gain enough political inﬂuence in Japan (see
Komori 2016).
- Nevertheless local democracy has reached the level in which municipalities and pre-
fectures can reject nuclear plants if they can conﬁrm their will, although rejection of US
military facilities is more difﬁcult, under the military expansion of China and North Korea.
- Germany is famous for its detailed city planning and landscape conservation. Japanese
cities were rapidly built up in the course of economic miracle under weak planning system,
but now Japan can be a little proud of managing the worldʼs largest metropolitan region and
of having improved its planning and conservation system after the 1980s (Murakami 2003).
- Japanese (and German) precise and delicate service such as railway, restaurants, shops,
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various products, urban cleanness and safety are often praised. And probably this kind
of attractive side of Japan originates not only from the moderate, rational friendliness but
also from the well-known model of formality, collectivism and authority (e.g. JETRO
1999-2000; Japan Visitor 2017), in sum, relatively dependent feature of Japanese culture.
Here I very shortly review the concepts to interpret these Japanese unique characteristics.
Famous novelist and English literature scholar Natsume (1914) criticized the unrea-
sonable interventions to individual freedom by other groups (not by other individuals) in
Japan. He praised in comparison the British who are both free and aware of oneʼs obliga-
tions and avoid violence.
Political Scientist Maruyama (1946) wrote just after the defeat of the Second World
War on the ʻultra-nationalismʼ of Japan. The nation and state is superior, and private life
and internal values are not expressed. Therefore even the war crime defendants do not
recognize their own responsibility, because they acted just under the name of the state.
Recently even the government feels anxious about the passive Japanese electorate,
namely the declining voting rate around 50%, still lower in younger generations. Two
major models exist to explain this lower turn out. The lack of response of the political
system to peopleʼs (sometimes irrational?) expectation, and the lack of knowledge, thinking
and discussion among people. Not only to the second model, but also to the ﬁrst model of
lower participation, political education is required (Murakami 2016B).
1- 2. Osaka: Right-wing Populism and ʻCasino Expoʼ 2025
(1) Populism to abolish Osaka City government without explanation
In Japan, at ﬁrst sight, populism seems not so widespread as in some West European
countries or in the presidential election in 2016 of the USA. But this owes less to the
sound sense of Japanese electorate than to the non-existence of the acute immigrant prob-
lem and religious fundamentalism so far, partly because Japan is an island country and
across the sea East Asia countries are economically developing and offer rather import and
tourists for Japan. The potential for populism is much serious in Japan, when we observe
the violent nationalism and the discrimination against Korean or Chinese people in modern
history and partially at present. If some serious stress similar to Europe occurs, probably
Japan would easily welcome authoritative and irrational politics.
Here I pick up the case in which, in spite of the lack of deep social anxiety, a strong
right-wing populism party with simple dream and propaganda has been ruling Osaka and
shaking Japanese politics in the 2010s (Arima 2017).
This Ishin Party2) and its founder and leader, Osaka governor, later Osaka mayor,
2) The meaning of ʻIshinʼ is total renovation and ʻMeiji Ishinʼ in the latter 19th century which realized
Japanʼs economic and military modernization under political centralization. But ʻShowa Ishinʼ was the
slogan of the 2･26 military coup dʼetat in 1936 which killed politicians and completed the way to →
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Hashimoto, criticize the inefﬁciency and ʻvested interestʼ of the public ofﬁcials and public
sector (not that of big business). He launched ʻOsaka Metropolis Planʼ which abolishes
Osaka City and integrates it into Osaka Prefecture, and with this ʻdreamʼ won successfully
mayoral and council elections. Such a plan would normally receive little support from the
citizen, because the disappearance of the strong big city government weakens policy ability
and self-government of Osaka. But Mayor Hashimotoʼs appeal was extraordinary and tac-
tical, which included:
- to avoid to explain that the city government shall be abolished,
- to declare simply that in this way Osaka adopts the local government system of Tokyo
(the Tokyo City was abolished in the total mobilization process under the Second World
War) and can catch up with that world city,
- to threaten media people and politicians who are opposed to this plan and Ishin with
repeated crude language via telephone, E-mail and twitter, together with his followers.
As the next step, in the 2012 Lower House election, this Ishin Party gained 20% votes
and, oddly, contributed to the great victory of the LDP led by Abe. Because this right-
wing party can attract voters not from the conservative LDP, but rather from the non-LDP
medium voters who otherwise would vote for the Democratic Party, the second largest
liberal party. Actually in Japan and Osaka the unemployment rate is not very high, but
hard and long labour for full-time workers and low wage for part-time workers can be
manipulated to dissatisfaction, not against the rich but against the public ofﬁcials whose
condition is ʻnormalʼ.
This Ishinʼs populism is more wide and aggressive than that of Prime Minister Koi-
zumi in the 2000s, who appealed with the simple dream of privatization of postal service
ʻfor Japanʼs revivalʼ, but attacked only the oppositions in his own party, the LDP.
(2) Response of media and people
Also remarkable was the response of media and people. The simple and authoritative,
often aggressive, appeal of drastic changes has been often applauded as strong leadership.
The Ishin Party is correctly classiﬁed as "right wing" in foreign media (The Economist
2014; Süddeutsche Zeitung 2014) and by some political scientists (Schreurs 2014; Nakano
2015: 152, 211; Nakakita 2012: last chapter; Murakami 2014: chap.7). Nevertheless, not
a few Japanese media and political scientists called this party "the third pole", a new and
fresh alternative to the LDP and the Democratic Party, and so supported its rise. At last
the leader Hashimoto excluded violently moderate members in 2015, and in the 2016
Upper House election the Ishin Party became classiﬁed into the Constitution revisionist,
conservative side along with the LDP. Its share of vote fell down to 9%, but can still
capture the vote from the Democratic Party which competes with the LDP. Especially in
→ militarism. The ʻIshin regimeʼ in South Korea in 1972 was also authoritative.
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Osaka, Ishin continues to be the largest party and maintains the positions of governor and
mayors of Osaka and other cities.
Another point is the (objectively) lower level of the ʻdissatisfactionʼ as the back-
ground. The issue is the relative ʻdeclineʼ of Osaka, the former ʻeconomic capitalʼ of
Japan3). The absolute level of economy and living is not downward, but the Ishin has
successfully touched the historical dream of Osaka to rival Tokyo. Anyway with such issue
of regional competition, the right-wing populists in Europe would not get much support.
The third point is that as to the ʻOsaka Metropolis Planʼ, the referendum ballot paper
asked about ʻthe establishment of special districts in Osaka Cityʼ and did not explain that
the city government shall be abolished. And yet not much criticism was expressed against
this ʻfraudʼ ballot. The media often delivers ofﬁcial statements. However, on the level of
social movements and internet rather free discussion took place with much counter-
opinions from the intellectuals and intelligent citizen. Among the resisting citizen, Mayor
Hashimoto was sometimes depicted as a dictator (e.g. Anonymous 2015).
From such situation we can assume that many Japanese and especially Osaka people
have irrational and dependent social attitude which makes them vulnerable to populism. It
is interesting to mention the emotional and ʻOwaraiʼ (fun-oriented) culture of Osaka, but
here is no space.
Anyway, after complicated political process and discussion, this ʻOsaka Metropolis
Planʼ to abolish Osaka City was rejected in the referendum in 2015 with a slight margin
(Murakami 2016A).
(3) Osaka Expo 2025 and Casino Construction Plan
Now the Ishin has to launch another dream to revitalize Osaka. Some Ishinʼs major
3) Osaka is the second largest urban area in Japan. It is the centre of Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto metropolitan
region holding 16 million population and as the city itself is ranked as around the 20th, almost equal to
Barcelona, Brussels and San Francisco (Institute for Urban Strategies/ the Mori Memorial Foundation
2016; Fujii / Murakami / Mori eds. 2015: chap. 16).
In Edo Era, Tokyo (Edo), Kyoto and Osaka were called ʻthe three capitalsʼ of Japan, but after Meiji
Tokyo grew to be the primary city, in the course of the active central governmentʼs intervention in
economy, big corporationsʼ concentration and recent worldwide globalization. Therefore the feeling of
economic decline is strong in Osaka, while Kyoto is still proud of its traditional and modern culture.
But Osaka has been making much efforts to develop high-class infrastructure, city amenity and culture,
so we had better interpret that the trend of automatic concentration in the capital region is strong like in
many other middle-sized countries.
Except GDP per capita or the number of big companies, Osaka city can be proud of its attractiveness
compared with Tokyo, in terms of compactness, some high-tech industries, huge castle park, riverside
landscape like London and green parks, cool highland nearby, museums, universities, shopping, food and
culture (in combination with Kyoto and Kobe in Kansai region). The city is now more evaluated by
foreign tourists (Serizawa 2015), hopefully also more by foreign corporations, because the access from
Osaka to many areas in Japan and in East Asia is shorter than from Tokyo, and the cost of living and
ofﬁce is lower (cf. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Kansai Bureau 2017).
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politicians are eager to construct Japanʼs ﬁrst casino resort in Osaka. A great casino
facility shall attract visitors from the prospering East Asia region. Some business leaders
hope to vitalize Osaka with world exposition after the Tokyo Olympic Games in 2020.
Combining these two aims, Osaka Prefecture and City are planning the 2025 World
Exposition. The organizers including national government now propose technology-
related ʻfuture societyʼ as the main theme. The success of an exposition will attract visi-
tors, improve Osakaʼs popularity, especially as an attractive world city with some leading
industries, and induce much construction work.
For the worldʼs problems technological inventions are one of the major solutions,
while government and society also must make efforts for transformation.
On the other hand, there is strong criticism to this Osaka Expo plan.
- It is strange that this expo is planned not in the city area such as the open ground
north of Osaka Station (like Milano Expo and Tokyo Olympic Games), but on a remote
reclaimed island. It requires an otherwise unnecessary subway line, when much investment
is necessary rather for protection against the huge tsunami4) which is to occur in the Paciﬁc
Ocean, south of Shikoku.
- Therefore this Osaka Expo can be regarded as an instrument to construct casino on the
site later. Ishin politicians favor casino, which has been prohibited in Japan. Opinion
survey shows strong disagreement, partially because there already exist abundant,
diversiﬁed small gamble facilities in Japan.
- The main theme of this exposition is vague. Actual Ishin politics in Osaka is colored
with efﬁciency and oppression. The party leader Hashimoto attacked at ﬁrst Itami Airport,
then Osaka City and its labour union, the artists of Bunraku puppet show or professors
who are criticizing him. Mayor Hashimoto introduced an ordinance to prohibit all political
activities of public ofﬁcials, which is almost unconstitutional (Asahishinbun Osaka Sha-
kaibu 2015; Fujii/ Murakami/ Mori eds. 2015). His comments in 2013 that Japanʼs
wartime ʻIanfuʼ (military prostitutes by mobilization) system was necessary caused interna-
tional criticism and disgust. Such politics is far from providing an international expo with
meaningful themes.
2. What Criteria are Useful for International Comparison?
Here I try to extract criteria for measurement, inspired by the Japanese uniqueness
compared mostly with Western culture above, mainly from the general idea on democracy
and civil society. Such criteria are expected to be worldwide applicable, and suitable to
understand Japan in international comparison.
4) Probably to avert huge tsunami, the new Osaka City Art Museum will have an impressive shape.
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(1) Categorizing values and attitude
From psychological studies of ʻpersonalityʼ as well as ʻvaluesʼ, we could learn what
difference is important in comparing people. One of the famous theories of values recog-
nizes ten universal values: power, achievement, hedonism (pleasure), stimulation, self-
direction (freedom), benevolence, universalism (both a sort of love and care), tradition,
conformity and security (Kazdin ed. 2000).
The theory of post-materialism emphasizes the great change around 1970s from the
materialist values (economic growth, physical security etc.) to the post-materialist values
(quality of life, environmental protection, self-expression etc.). Anyway in the 2016 Upper
House election in Japan, the LDP under PM Abe won with totally ʻmaterialisticʼ appeals of
economic recovery, even when this Government is pushing authoritative policies including
the total revision of the liberal Constitution.
In political science, political culture and attitude is an important topic. It includes
national pride, identity, political trust, support and cooperation, participation (cognition of
its inﬂuence and meaning) and alienation. In the classical study “Civic Culture”, for exam-
ple peopleʼs awareness to and participation in politics and government were combined to
form the typology (Newton/ van Deth 2016: chap.9).
(2) Independence, rationality, public mind for democracy and civil society
Here I dare to take rather a deductive approach. That is to say to ﬁnd out important
variables, psychological attributes of a person, from ʻdemocracy theoryʼ and from ʻcivil
society modelʼ.
Theory and concept of democracy has grown complex after the simple concept of
majority rule, the rule of a nation or labor class, facilitated dictatorship in the 20th century.
Nowadays at least three other factors or ideas are regarded as necessary: freedom and
pluralism, deliberation and direct participation of people (cf. Hague/ Harrop 2010: chap.5).
In this framework, populism can be interpreted as a degenerating form of democracy,
which seeks for support by means of aggression and simpliﬁcation. Populism thus seeks
for the majority rule at the cost of pluralism and deliberation (Murakami 2014: chap.7).
The serious problem is that not only some genius politicians, but also many voters and
media favor this type of politics.
Next, civil society is deﬁned usually as society abundant of civic groups which are
separated from state and market, but also as the collective body of citizen which is con-
trary to the ʻmassʼ. According to the classic dichotomy of citizen and mass society, the
two major criteria are ʻindependent or dependentʼ and ʻrational or irrationalʼ (Fulcher/
Scott 2003: 361-363), and additionally ʻpublic mind or pure private interestʼ is important
(Murakami 2015)5).
5) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in →
R. L. R. Measurement of Comparative Social Attitudes: From a Perspective of Japan and Osaka 99
These three criteria seem suitable to interpret the phenomena or episodes in Japan and
Germany, and correspondent with the models for Japan, which were mentioned in the
beginning of this article.
(3) World Values Survey
One of the empirical international comparisons, the ʻWorld Values Surveyʼ report
(Chart 1), offers a two-dimensional graph of each countryʼs value characteristics. My
viewpoint, rationality and independence explained above, is near to these two axes coinci-
dentally. According to this WVS result, Japan is the most rational country in the world,
more rational than Germany, Britain etc.. And Japanese people are self-expressive, not so
much as Western Europeans but more than Koreans, Taiwanese and Chinese.
But is it really so? We easily imagine some reverse episodes as in 1. and 1-2.. Weak
democratization from below in Japan against despotism, compared with successes in
Europe, USA, South Korea and Taiwan in history. And ʻKaroshiʼ, one party dominance or
the astonishing referendum to abolish Osaka City government without explaining it exist
still in the 21st century. Japanese political participation, both in election and in demonstra-
tion, petition etc., is weaker at least than in Europe and North America (Chart 3; Klesner
2014: chap. 8, 9). On the other hand Japanese food, traditional art, gardens and modern
industrial products are balanced, of good quality and functioning well. But we have the
worst deﬁcit in public ﬁnance. When confronted with public (group, social and political)
problems, many Japanese people show irrational and dependent (conforming) attitude.
This classiﬁcation of the World Value Survey is very informative and suggestive, but
maybe should be understood with two remarks and cautions. First the two axes here are
not ʻrational-irrationalʼ and ʻself-expressive (independent)-dependentʼ, which I focus on in
this article. The axes used in the WVS are ʻsecular-rational vs. traditionalʼ and ʻself-
expressive vs. survivalʼ and so they may contain other elements and nuance.
The second remark is that both ʻsecular-rational vs. traditionalʼ index and ʻsurvival vs.
self-expressiveʼ index of one nation or one person may vary in different situations. We
had better treat and observe social attitude, separating its situations or modes between
→ 1948 declared in the Article 1:
“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”
This article can be interpreted as an ofﬁcial declaration of modern ideals, succeeding French “Declara-
tion des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen” in 1789, such as independence of individuals (free, equal,
dignity, right), rationality (reason) and public concern (conscience, brotherhood). Also the Japanese Con-
stitution in 1946 basically accepted and declared these types of value ideas.
In 2016, the suffrage of Japanese elections was expanded to 18 and 19 years old, and political educa-
tion at high school stage is being discussed and practiced. One example is the leaﬂets from Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications and Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technol-
ogy (Soumusho/ Monbukagakusyo 2016). What is recommended there are: knowledge, thinking from
plural angles, opinion-formation, discussion and participation.
100 Ritsumeikan Law Review No. 34, 2017
public and private modes, or political, group and private life. It is just as one folk are
talented in the woods, and another are active on the sea.
(4) The Gap of attitude between private and public modes
I try to visualize my model in Chart 2.. It is designed so that independence and
rationality are indicated separately for private and public mode or situation. The upper
right area may be ʻcivil societyʼ. The upper left area may be called ʻmeditative cultureʼ,
that is to say intelligence without action, but this will not spread so much.
The two linked marks for contemporary Japan, which indicate the wide distance
between the private mode and public mode, are based on the episodes I have mentioned
and on the survey data shown later in Chart 3 and 4. Similar two marks for Western
Europe are based on my direct and indirect observations on politics and society in
Germany, Switzerland and England. Related empirical data is not prepared in this article,
but can be obtained from various studies. As to the independent-dependent axis, data on
political participation and lifestyle are useful, also data under the theme ʻindividualism or
collectivismʼ (Gilovich/ Keltner/ Chen/ Nisbett 2013: 33-34). For the measurement of
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Chart 1: Country comparison according to World Values Survey
Source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp
Note: I wish to ask the researchers of a kind understanding to my making a smaller copy of the










































rationality, various outcomes such as university ranking, scientiﬁc inventions and industrial
products (these two are often different), urban policies, art or movie ﬁlms can be evaluated
and compared.
In this graph, also two other types of culture are suggested. The 'struggle culture' is a
world where everyone battles each other, forming sometimes alliances and brotherhood,
and often resorts to irrational, violent methods. The 'passive culture' is a world where
humble people are less independent and rational. These two types of culture seem to be
economically less productive, and politically difﬁcult to democratize in general.
On the other hand, we could assume that too independent attitude is likely to cause
conﬂict and lack of cooperation. Independent and individualistic tendency of European
people has invented both revolutions and rational rules for social coexistence (e.g. rule of
law, division of power, democracy), of course along with science and devastating conﬂicts.
Excessive rationality is unrealistic and not so harmful in itself. Anyway, rational and for-
malistic Japanese attitude is often interpreted not as the result of independence, but as the
result of dependence or conformity (Enomoto 2017).
(5) Relationship between private and public attitude
Further we can ponder about two questions. First, what factors cause the high and
low level of independence and rationality? Perhaps personal aptitude and training in human
relations are both inﬂuencing, but this question is not treated here.
The second is the mutual relationship between private and public attitude. Logically
there are three possible relationships.
- The consciousness in private life and that in public life strengthen each other.
- The consciousness in private life and that in public life are not directly linked, because
independence and rationality in public sphere requires larger energy under possible
oppression, and at the same time it requires care for others rather than private interest-
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data of other researchers
seeking. Moreover dependence or conformity reduces the rational thinking in public
sphere, but stimulates rationality in private sphere, because here people and companies (or
scholars?) are competing in the details under the same target and value-orientation.
- Between the two there is a reverse relationship. When someone puts energy for inde-
pendence and rationality in one mode, the energy for another mode will be absorbed (cf.
Naikakuhu Daijinkanbou Seihukouhoushitu 2015).
Observing Japan and Europe, I get each of these three impressions. However, at least
for some people, their private independent or rational attitude in everyday life will be
practiced also in public life (Appendix: Chart 5). The positive effect of the active, reason-
able and mutually aiding life style on governance and politics is argued in social science,
from the classic ʻsocial contractʼ theory to the recent ʻsocial capitalʼ model.
3. Empirical Research Results in Japan
(1) Survey researches on Japanese social attitudes
The framework of Chart 2 may enable an interesting analysis, if proper survey is
prepared. We can compare cultures in terms of the level of rationality and independence
in public and private modes. And also in one person, how these variables in different two
situations are related?
But here I just have collected several data from major survey researches in Japan.
<Sources>
1. Cabinet Ofﬁce, Government Public Relations, opinion poll on social consciousness
(Naikakuhu Seihu Kohositsu 2015)
2. The NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute, periodical researches on the
consciousness of the Japanese (NHK 2014)
3. Hakuhodo Institute of Life and Living, the biennial data on the Japanese people
(Hakuhodo Seikatu Sogo Kenkyujo 2016)
4. Consumer Affairs Agency, basic research on the consciousness of consumers (Sho-
hishacho 2016)
5. The Association for Promoting Fair Elections, opinion polls after the election of
the House of the Representatives (Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai).
Also the chronological overview (Toukyoudaigaku/ Dentuusouken 2010) of the result
for Japan in the World Values Survey is very useful.
(2) Gap and distance between public and private attitude
Here I try to test my hypothesis in Chart 2, especially the distance between public and
private modes, in (at least) Japanese social attitude with some survey results.
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Chart 3 Japanese social attitude (independence - dependence)
in public and private modes
■ public mode
Source: 1 year 1991 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
(1) Do you think it is necessary in the future to enhance more the mind to ʻlove the stateʼ among the Japanese?
Yes 77.0 74.7 74.6 80.8 78.5 75.8
No 11.8 12.6 12.1 10.4 10.4 12.5
Note: Figures are percentage throughout all tables here, unless otherwise indicated.
Source: 2 year 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013
＜association and struggle orientation (in local community) ＞
(2) If environmental problems threating residents arise in this area, what would you do ?
Start citizen movement together and make efforts to solve problems.
24.8 26.5 29.1 25.5 21.8 15.9
＜association and struggle orientation (in workplace)＞
(3) If you are working in a new company, and among the workers strong dissatisfaction arises as
to the conditions such as salary or working hours, what would you do ?
Organize labour union together and make efforts to improve the conditions.
22.0 21.9 20.5 18.2 17.8 16.5
(4) Have you done following actions for politics in this year? (plural choices possible)
participation in demonstrations 1.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6
signature for petitions 32.0 21.2 24.5 21.6 18.5 16.4
acting as a party member 2.9 2.5 1.9 2.2 1.8 1.9
Source: 5 year 2003 2005 2009 2012 2014
(5) What did you consider when you voted in the Lower House election? (plural answers possible)
The power balance between political parties
for electoral district 13.2 9.7 10.0 8.4 9.5
for proportional representation 18.2 14.5 13.1 10.0 ―
Note: ― no data available
■ private mode
Source: 2 year 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013
(6) As to the balance of work and free time (leisure), which do you think is the best ?
priority to work 31.2 25.8 25.6 25.5 26.1 25.0
balance between the two 32.4 35.3 35.1 37.5 34.9 35.9
priority to free time 34.0 36.1 37.1 34.2 35.5 36.7
(7) In general, how do you think about the separation of family names in marriage ?
separation is allowed + good 27.5 34.1 40.7 43.1 39.6 41.4
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Source: 3 year 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
(8) I have a hobby to enjoy all year round. 60.2 54.1 52.6 53.8 52.3
Chart 4 Japanese social attitude (rational - irrational) in public and private modes
■ public mode
Source: 2 year 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013
＜knowledge about human right＞
(1) Which of the following is designated as the right of the nation by the Constitution?
right of minimum living standard 76.3 75.2 75.5 75.5 77.1 77.9
right to unite for labour union 27.1 25.5 23.0 20.4 21.9 21.7
freedom of expression 43.4 39.0 37.2 36.2 34.8 36.4
■ private mode
Source: 2 year 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013
＜attitude concerning savings and consumption＞
(2) If you now get special income almost as much as your monthly salary, what is the best way
to treat that money ?
consume with planning 42.4 42.8 44.3 46.2 43.9 46.3
reserve as savings for future 42.0 42.3 41.1 40.4 43.2 41.5
consume without planning 12.8 12.3 12.2 10.5 9.9 9.7
■ public and private mode
Source: 3 year 1998 2002 2006 2010 2014
(3) I often read books for knowledge
and culture
29.3 26.3 25.2 24.1 21.2
(4) I wish to understand always my
health conditions
58.1 50.8 47.2 46.7 43.3
(5) I read newspaper weekdays 85.6 76.0 62.7
(6) I use internet and mails on mobile
and smartphones weekdays
57.3 69.3 80.5
Source: 4 year 2013 2015




environmental effect 35.9 37.0
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Chart 3 collects some results which concern the axis ʻindependent or dependentʼ.
Question (1) shows the afﬁrmative opinion to nationalism ʻindoctrinationʼ, a sort of
dependent attitude. Also questions from (2) to (4) show passive attitude to the threatening
problems in community and workplace, and low political participation except signature for
petitions. Moreover all such tendency is deepening.
But in private matters, freedom and tolerance seem to be growing. According to
question (6), the answer ʻpriority to workʼ is decreasing for the beneﬁt of some individual
freedom. Question (7) shows a growing tolerance to the separation of family names in
marriage, which is sometimes criticized for damaging the Japanese tradition from the con-
servative side.
Chart 4 collects some results which concern the axis ʻrational or irrationalʼ, here asked
mostly as the acquisition and use of proper knowledge. The result of question (1) can be
serious for constitutional democracy. Those who know the right to unite for labour union
and the freedom of expression are minority and decreasing, although the right of minimum
living standard is well known.
But when questioned about private lifestyle in (2), many will treat a special big
income in a clever manner, and this rational attitude is increasing. Questions (4) and (7)
indicate that Japanese people care much about price, function and security of goods and
services, and their own health. This itself makes rational and wise lifestyle and society,
but their care for the environment is relatively lower.
In questions (3), (5) and (6), with other researches, internet is replacing traditional
books and newspapers. Newspapers are, in general, informing about public and social
affairs in some intelligent way. Additionally, among books, entertaining novels and prac-
tical books are read far more than books on law and politics (Yomiuri 2016).
Rationality and intelligence in political participation is a difﬁcult ideal, apart from the
plural deﬁnition of rationality and the function of emotion in politics. It is a hard task for
media and political science etc. to promote, under controversial and even demagogic
information ﬂows, the understanding of institutions, parties and policies. For example, in
the 2016 Upper House election, Prime Minister Abe did not speak on his strong intention
of Constitution revision, the most important issue, just until the victory. Many voters did
not understand the meaning that parties promoting constitutional change attain the two-
thirds of seats. As a result, while the majority of electorate does not agree with the con-
servative total constitutional revision, the election result proved quite different (Japan
Times 2016; Murakami 2017).
Appendix: ʻResource Supplement Modelʼ for Democracy
So far social attitudes have been observed as the average in each country. But in
Japan and in Germany there are diverse types of social attitude and they constitute the
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structure which may foster or weaken democracy.
The model A (Chart 5) tries to describe the participation and inﬂuence of liberal citi-
zen and its groups in democracy. The following explanation I wish to call ʻresource
supplement modelʼ, in comparison with the famous ʻresource mobilization theoryʼ.
My question is: why does the Japanese liberal citizen, who is small in quantity around
10~20% of the whole population (Chart 3) and canʼt easily gain the majority in elections,
still have some inﬂuence in politics and society? Of course their efforts to mobilize
resources are great and crucial, but other possible explanation is that their actions, appeals,
demonstrations and suits in the courts, can be supported by both common people (silent
majority) and institutional protectors in present Japan. This silent majority does not partic-
ipate in politics actively, but they are experiencing not a little independent and rational
private (and business) life and therefore are tolerant and sometimes cooperate moderately,
for example with signatures, in 2012 and 2015 with participation in demonstrations, to the
active citizen movements. Besides institutional organs such as courts, lawyers, national
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Chart 5 Model A: ʻresource supplement modelʼ for participation and democracy
1.  active (liberal) citizen
  (independent, rational, public-minded)
2.  support from moderate citizen
  in election, signature, opinion poll,
  elections etc.
  (relatively independent and rational
       in private life)
3.  Support and
   protection from
   political-social system
   (parliament members,
   parties, agencies, court,
   lawyers, scholars,






Chart 6 Model B: social attitudes and conservative/ liberal political orientation





















Note:          attracted by the ‘solution’ of reducing public ofﬁcials and foreign immigrants
(private interest)
and local parliaments and media will support liberal citizen, especially when they are
threatened by the government or right-wing aggressive groups, as far as the human rights
are institutionalized and ofﬁcially respected (Murakami 2015). Of course these two
supportive factors can be wiped away, if the government oppresses ordinary people, or
demolishes the human rights through media control or constitutional revisions. This is
what actually happened in the 1930s under the militarism, even after the moderate democ-
ratization in the 1920s, and what the Ishin Party has realized to some extent in Osaka.
The model B (Chart 6) assumes that each type of social attitude, including those
explained before, fosters (or hinders) the support to liberal or conservative positions. In
the middle column, social attitudes or preference types such as public interest, private
interest, rationality-irrationality and independence-dependence of each electorate are
arranged. On the right side are shown the basic conservatives values, small government
and authority, and additionally the right-wing populism. On the left side there are the
basic values of the liberals, big government, freedom and tolerance (Murakami 2014: chap.
5). Then the correspondences between each social attitude and each political positions can
be inferred, as indicated with many arrows.
This model should be tested on survey data, but my speculation is that the preference
to the conservative party and politicians is natural and normal, because private interest
including competition, taxpayersʼ wish or nationalism (anxiety to alien people) and depend-
ence on the strong leader are nearer to the human instinct. On the other hand, the support
towards the liberal side is ʻartiﬁcialʼ and cultural, namely requires some special social
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